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I. INTRODUCTION
On March 25, 1911, a fire started in a rag bin at the Triangle Shirt-
waist Company in New York City. Hundreds of women worked there,
sewing garments ten to twelve hours a day, seven days a week. The blaze
swept through the upper floors of the factory, beyond the reach of fire
ladders. The exit doors were locked, leaving the workers trapped as the
fire took hold. A crowd in the street below looked on in horror as hun-
dreds of young girls, their hair and clothes burning, threw themselves
from the building to escape the blaze. one hundred forty-six workers,
most of them women, died.
Almost a century later, history repeated itself. In 1993, the worst in-
dustrial fire yet recorded broke out at the mammoth Kadar Industrial Toy
Co. near Bangkok. Kadar's 3000 workers, who were mostly women,
some as young as thirteen, made items such as Sesame Street dolls, Bart
Simpsons, and Muppets that were marketed under the Fisher-Price, Has-
bro, and Tyco brand-names and destined for American retailers such as
Wal-Mart and Toys R Us. Again, the fire exits were blocked. Again, des-
perate women jumped from the upper stories as their hair and clothes
caught fire. The death toll was 188, with another 469 seriously injured.
Despite their wide separation in time and distance, the root causes of
these disasters are all too similar. The Triangle fire took place in a U.S.
economy undergoing a profound transition from agriculture to industry,
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from local to national markets, from household enterprises to giant cor-
porations. The economic transformation created vast fortunes alongside
widespread urban poverty. Frenetic growth alternated with savage reces-
sion. Calls for reform and regulation were rejected in the name of laissez
faire orthodoxy. The courts zealously protected the rights of property own-
ers, while outlawing worker attempts to form unions, and striking down
state attempts to set minimum standards for wages, health, and safety as
illegal restraints on trade, or a taking of property. Ultimately, however,
workers organized, muckrakers exposed the sweatshops, populist move-
ments erupted, social reformers demanded change, and a Republican,
Teddy Roosevelt, advised by enlightened corporate leaders, laid out a re-
form agenda that eventually led to the enactment of legal and regulatory
protections for workers, consumers, and the environment. Moreover, con-
trary to the dire warnings from the National Association of Manufacturers,
the banks, and big business, these reforms fostered not only economic eq-
uity, but also a faster-growing, more stable economy; one in which
workers could afford to buy the products they made and companies com-
peted with one another by innovating rather than exploiting their
workforce.
The economic transformation occurring on the international level to-
day is in important ways analogous to that which took place domestically
in the United States in the early part of the last century. The contemporary
process of globalization has generated vast fortunes for multinational cor-
porations-as of three years ago, forty-nine out of the hundred largest
economies in the world were multinationals. Yet little of this wealth has
reached the workers of the world's new sweatshops. Economic growth is
failing to deliver "human development"-that is, tangible improvements
in the welfare and dignity of the majority of developing-country popula-
tions.
Indeed, according to the United Nations' most recent report on hu-
man welfare, standards of living are deteriorating in many countries of
the world:'
[H]uman development is proceeding too slowly. For many coun-
tries the 1990s were a decade of despair. Some 54 countries are
poorer now than in 1990. In 21 a larger proportion of people is
going hungry. In 14, more children are dying before age five. In
12, primary school enrolments are shrinking. In 34, life expec-
tancy has fallen. Such reversals in survival were previously rare.2
1. UNDP, SUMMERY: HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2003 5 (2003), available at
http://hdr.undp.org/reports/global/2003/df/hdr03-summary.pdf.
2. Id. at 2.
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These trends demonstrate that in the world today, no less than in early-
20th century America, economic development creates only the potential
for real improvements in the lives of working people. As the International
Labor Organization (ILO) states, "... growth can be ruthless or it can be
poverty reducing--depending on its pattern, on structural aspects of the
economy, and on public policies."3 Unfortunately, the mode of
international regulation currently dominant has produced an exploitative
and unstable economic system all-too similar to that of pre-reform
United States International law and trading regimes protect property but
not people. The World Trade Organization (WTO) enforces copyright
but ignores worker rights.
In the absence of effective labor regulation at the international level,
multinational corporations have every incentive to base their operations
in countries where labor is cheapest, most docile, and least protected.
Governments are driven into a regulatory "race to the bottom" as they
seek to provide the most attractive environment to international capital.
While much of the discussion of this phenomenon has centered on the
adverse effects endured by developed nations, developing countries are
not insulated from such detriments.4 For example, it is all too common
for multinationals to outsource from an already cheap labor market in a
developing nation to another even cheaper one, regardless of whether
slight wage increases or a regulatory shift in workers rights has occurred.
And typically, in countries that lack even the most basic human rights
standards, the social safety nets in place are far from equipped to handle
such perpetual economic erosion. In other words, it is becoming appar-
ent that the race to the bottom is being carried out in a "bottomless"
vacuity. Moreover, the downward pressure on wages produced by this
system minimizes the potential economic benefits of foreign investment
to its host countries by suppressing domestic demand and forcing con-
tinuing dependence on export markets
3. Press Release, International Labour Organization, Global unemployment remains at
record levels in 2003 but annual ILO jobs report sees signs of recovery (Jan. 22, 2004) avail-
able at www.ilo.orglpublic/englishlbureaulinf/pr/
200 4/l.htm. See also, SANDRA POLASKI,
TRADE AND LABOR STANDARDS: A STRATEGY FOR DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 10 (2003), avail-
able at http://www.ceip.org/files/pdf/PolaskiTradeEnglish.pdf.
4. See generally, AMERICAN CTR. FOR INT'L LABOR SOLIDAgITY/AFL-CIO, JUSTICE
FOR ALL: A GUIDE TO WORKER RIGHTS IN THE GLOBAL ECONOMY 249-52 (2003) [hereinafter
JUSTICE FOR ALL].
5. See, Thomas Palley, The Economic Case for International Labor Standards: Theory
and Some Evidence, AFL-CIO PUB. POLICY DEP'T (2004); Thomas Palley, Labor Standards,
Economic Governance, and Income Distribution: The Cross-Country Evidence, AFL-CIO
PUB. POLICY DEP'T (2004); TOKE AIDT & ZAFIRIS TZANNATOS, WORLD BANK, UNIONS AND
COLLECTIVE BARGAINING: ECONOMIC EFFECTS IN A GLOBAL ENVIRONMENT (2002).
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In the early-twentieth-century United States, the race-to-the-bottom
problem was ultimately addressed by effective action from the legisla-
ture and judiciary at the national level.6 If conditions are to improve for
the workers of the new industrializing nations of the South, national-
level responses are not enough. The premise of this paper-and a fun-
damental goal of free labor movements in both the developed and
developing world-is that promotion of, and adherence to, the core labor
standards defined by the ILO must accompany economic growth if real
human development is to be achieved. Developing countries "badly need
access to rich markets for their products, and basic labor rights will pro-
mote more equitable, broad-based development and greater distribution
of the gains from trade to the poor."7 Ultimately, these standards must be
incorporated into the WTO's global trading regime. In the meantime,
adherence to these rights must become a condition of trade relationships
between the U.S. and its trading partners.
Below we discuss the meaning and significance of core labor stan-
dards and the importance of linking them to trade agreements. We explain
why the "protectionist" label often attributed to such linkage efforts by
their detractors is misleading, as the example of China illustrates, repres-
sion of labor rights constitutes a form of unfair competition which
undermines efforts to create a more just and stable world economy.
Finally, we discuss measures taken by the United States to encour-
age its trading partners to respect basic labor rights. For example, the
recent experience in Cambodia demonstrates how such linkage can, in
fact, promote democracy and development. We also consider the recently
negotiated U.S.-Jordan Free Trade Agreement, comparing the model of
trade-labor linkage therein to the inadequacy of those provisions con-
tained in subsequently enacted bilateral trade agreements.
II. CORE LABOR STANDARDS-THEIR DEFINITION
AND IMPORTANCE
In May 1998, President Clinton addressed the WTO on the need to
build a global trading system that delivers real benefits to ordinary people.
He called on the WTO to work with the ILO to ensure that core labor
standards are incorporated into the rules of international trade, arguing that
6. United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1941).
7. POLASKI, supra note 3, at 5.
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these standards "are essential not only to workers rights, but to human
rights everywhere."'
Just one month after his address, the ILO's 177 member countries
unanimously ratified a landmark Declaration on Fundamental Rights at
Work (Declaration).9 The Declaration identifies four universally accepted
workplace human rights as core labor rights, namely:
(a) freedom of association and the effective recognition of the
right to collective bargaining;
(b) the elimination of all forms of forced or compulsory labor;
(c) the effective abolition of child labour; and
(d) the elimination of discrimination in respect of employment
and occupation.'0
The core labor standards identified by the Declaration have their ori-
gin in eight ILO conventions approved by the Organization over the past
fifty years." Yet, the Declaration was born out of the frustration that after
nearly half a century, little progress had been made in achieving univer-
sal adoption of these conventions in both developed and developing
countries. The United States, for example, has to date ratified only two
of the eight ILO Conventions that relate to 
these core rights.
2
The Declaration represents a breakthrough for the world community,
not only because it has largely ended controversy as to which particular
worker rights constitute the internationally recognized set of "core"
worker rights, but also because it expressed its member countries' assent
to the principle that they were bound to respect and promote these rights,
8. President William J. Clinton, Address at the Second Ministerial Conference of the
World Trade Organization (May 18, 1998), in 50TH ANNIVERSARY OF THE MULTILATERAL
TRADING SYSTEM 16, 17 (1998).
9. ILO, ILO Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work, in 2 INTER-
NATIONAL LABOUR CONFERENCE 86TH SESSION RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS 20 (1998),
available at http://www.ilo.org.dyn/declaris/DECLARATIONWEB. INDEXPAGE.
10. Id. at 20.
11. Freedom of Association and Protection of the Right to Organise Convention, July 9,
1948, C87; Right to Organise and Collectively Bargain Convention, July 1, 1949, C98; Forced
Labour Convention, June 28, 1930, C29; Abolition of Forced Labour Convention, June 25,
1957, C105; Equal Remuneration Convention, June 19, 1951, C100; Discrimination (Em-
ployment and Occupation) Convention, June 25, 1958, C 11; Minimum Age Convention, June
26, 1973, C 138; Convention Concerning the Prohibition and Immediate Action for the Elimi-
nation of the Worst Forms of Child Labour, June 17, 1999; all available at http://ilo.org/
ilolex/english.
12. The U.S. has ratified Convention Nos. 105 and 182. Two other ILO member
States-Myanmar and Oman-have ratified only two core conventions. In contrast, 31 of the
ILO's 177 member States have ratified 7 core conventions, and 102 have ratified all 8 of them.
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regardless of whether they had formally adopted the relevant ILO in-
struments. The Declaration states:
All [ILO] Members, even if they have not ratified the Conven-
tions in question, have an obligation arising from the very fact of
membership in the Organization to respect, to promote and to
realize, in good faith and in accordance with the Constitution,
the principles concerning the fundamental rights which are the
subject of those Conventions...""
The fact that the Declaration was adopted unanimously offers an ef-
fective answer to the argument that the countries of the South should not
be obliged to respect labor rights because these rights reflect the cultural
values of developed countries. The first two principles (regarding free-
dom of association and collective bargaining, and elimination of forced
labor) guarantee human autonomy at the workplace and ensure that peo-
ple have the means to achieve whatever substantive goals they choose,
while the second two principles (regarding child labor and discrimina-
tion in employment) represent minimal conditions to achieving a life of
dignity and self-sufficiency. These are the rights that people must have"regardless of economic development, because they inhere in human
beings."' In response to the charge that these rights are "supposedly se-
lective,"'5 the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions
(ICFTU), 16 recognized as the world's largest and most significant global
federation of trade union centers, has stated that, "th[e]se particular stan-
dards have been endorsed universally precisely because they do
constitute what is globally agreed to be a basic minimum set of basic
workers' rights that can and must be protected."' 17
Nor can these four principles be dismissed as economically infeasi-
ble for poor countries seeking to capitalize on their comparative
advantage in labor costs. They do not require countries to establish par-
ticular standards for working conditions and levels of compensation, but
merely to create conditions that enable workers to bargain, individually
13. See supra note 9.
14. Polaski, supra note 3, at 20.
15. See, e.g., CUTS, Third World Intellectuals and NGOs' Statement Against Linkage
(TWIN-SAL), at www.cuts.org (1999).
16. The ICFrU represents 233 affiliated organizations from 152 countries that collec-
tively represent 148 million workers. See ICFTU, What It Is, What It Does . . ., at http:/!icftu.org/displaydocument.asp?DocType=Overview&index=99091 6422&Language=EN. The
ICFTU "unites workers in free and democratic trade unions and provides them with a means
of consultation and collaboration to further their individual and collective aims." I INTERNA-
TIONAL LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT LAWS 43-7 (William L. Keller et al. eds., 2d ed. 2003).
17. ICFTU, Enough Exploitation is Enough: A Response to the Third World Intellectu-
als and NGO's Statement Against Linkage (TWIN-SAL) 6 (1999), at http://www.hartford-
hwp.com/archives/25a/022.html.
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and collectively on their own behalf. Freedom of association and the
right to collectively bargain, for instance, while clearly not determinative
of any particular substantive terms of employment, presume an inde-
pendent voice at work and an opportunity for workers to exercise more
influence over the distribution of economic gains and other conditions of
employment. As one commentator states:
Core labour standards are considered enabling human rights; they
set standards concerning processes (e.g., freedom of association).
They seek to realise the conditions reflected in the very strong as-
sumptions underlying neo-classical economic models, namely
freedom of choice, equal bargaining power, and full informa-
tion.... Hence, unlike substantive labour standards, core labour
standards do not bear on production costs (with the exception of
forced labour and slavery). They do not impair a country's rela-
tive comparative advantages.
On a broader level the core labor standards are enabling rights that
support the development of democracy. Empirical literature offers strong
support that there is a nexus between respect for labor standards and the
development of democratic institutions. Harvard's Dani Rodrik, for ex-
ample, has found "quite persuasive evidence that the enhancement of
democratic institutions is associated with higher wages for workers."'
9
Rodrik concludes that "democratic institutions tend to shift the func-
tional distribution of income in manufacturing from profits to wages ...
[while] authoritarian regimes transfer income from labor to employers."
20
Moreover, free trade union movements that develop as a result of
adherence to core labor standards are themselves democratic institutions
that allow workers to participate in and gain control over a fundamental
aspect of their lives. They strengthen, and in turn are strengthened by, the
larger political institutions alongside which they develop. As Rodrik
states:
Democracy serves to raise wages in part through other channels
than the freedom of association and collective bargaining. Compe-
tition among political parties and access by workers to political
institutions can shape a whole range of legislation and institutions
that determine labor-market outcomes. Rules on arbitration and
18. MARYKE DESSING, ICTSO RESOURCE PAPER No. 1, THE SOCIAL CLAUSE AND SUS-
TAINABLE DEVELOPMENT (2001), available at http://www.icstd.org/pubs/series.htm.
19. Dani Rodrik, Democracies Pay Higher Wages, 114 Q. J. ECON. 707, 721 (1999);
See also, Dani Rodrik, Democracy and Economic Performance I (1997) (unpublished paper,
1997, available at http://ksghome.harvard.edu/-drodrik
/demoecon.pdf).
20. Rodrik, Democracies Pay Higher Wages, supra note 19, at 725-26.
Fall 20041
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on the hiring and firing of workers, minimum wages, provisions
on social insurance and other benefits, the generosity of public-
sector wages, and a myriad of other public policies have a bear-
ing on the general level of wages in a country because they
affect the bargaining strength of labor and the value of outside
options available to workers and employers."
In short, respect for core labor standards fosters the growth of democ-
ratic institutions, both within the labor movement and political life as a
whole, which in turn encourages the more equitable distribution of
wealth.
III. THE ARGUMENT FOR TRADE-LABOR LINKAGE
As noted above, the ILO's 1998 Declaration on Core Labor Stan-
dards responds to a growing sense that the current international trade
regime has failed to answer the needs of working people. Even the inter-
national institutions that have most enthusiastically propagated trade
liberalization have agreed, at least theoretically, that labor rights should
be respected. Thus, in its 1996 Singapore Declaration, the WTO ministe-
rial conference stated that "[we] renew our commitment to the
observance of internationally recognized labour standards., 2 Even the
World Bank, which has frequently required recipients of its structural
adjustment programs to take actions inimical to labor interests, has rec-
ognized in a recent report that "[s]ound industrial relations between
employers and employees can lead to a stable economy." The same re-
port argues that "developing labor standards needs to go hand in hand
with building institutional capacity and trust between workers, employ-
ers, and the government. 23
Nevertheless, the WTO has continued to reject all efforts to develop or
even consider a trading system that would treat the enforcement of worker
rights in the global economy as either a moral imperative or an economic
necessity. The WTO Ministerial meetings in Seattle in 1999 failed to agree
to convene a working group that would merely discuss the relationship of
trade to worker rights. The following WTO Ministerial in Qatar in 2001
not only again refused to initiate such a process, but insisted on softening a
statement that would have "welcomed" the ILO's work on labor standards
to one that simply "took note" of it. The WTO's justification for its posi-
tion, in so far as it has deigned to offer one, appears to be that
21. Id. at 21.
22. JUSTICE FOR ALL, supra note 4, at 175.
23. TOKE AIDT & ZAFIRIS TZANNATOS, supra note 5.
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incorporating labor standards into the global trade regime would allow
rich countries to take "protectionist" measures against the developing
nations that would prevent the latter from legitimately exploiting their
comparative wage advantage to attract export industry and ultimately
improve their standard of living.
2 4
This argument suffers from two major flaws: first, as a matter of
principle, the WTO's refusal to take action against countries that violate
internationally agreed upon core labor standards is inconsistent with its
efforts to prevent other forms of "unfair competition." Second, as a prac-
tical matter, the WTO's apparent faith that exploitation of comparative
advantage inevitably benefits the working people of low-wage countries
is misplaced if workers are unable to capture a significant share of the
wealth they generate.
Regarding the first issue; the WTO's global trading regime aims to
create a rules-based system that permits Member States to compete
against each other in the world market under defined parameters. The
many agreements negotiated and enforced by the WTO embody collec-
tive decisions that certain practices cannot be tolerated and may be
subjected to countermeasures, because they are an inefficient or unfair
means of securing competitive advantage. By virtue of these agreements,
members of the global trading community accept certain trade obliga-
tions and understand that they may face retaliatory trade measures if they
violate those obligations.
For example, the Anti-Dumping Agreement reflects a judgment that
enterprises ought not to charge less for their goods in foreign markets than
their cost of production or selling price in domestic markets. Similarly, the
Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures disciplines the use
of subsidies and authorizes countries to charge countervailing duties under
certain circumstances. The Technical Barriers to Trade Agreement seeks to
ensure that member countries' domestic regulations, standards, testing,
and certification procedures do not create unnecessary obstacles to trade.
Under the Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property
Rights, governments must provide minimum levels of protection to the
intellectual property of fellow members. Disputes under these agreements
are resolved by recourse to the WTO's dispute settlement procedures. If a
violation is found, aggrieved parties are permitted to impose
countervailing tariffs against the violator. Such tariffs are not treated as
"protectionist" but rather as legitimate retaliation aimed at deterring
24. See JUSTICE FOR ALL, supra note 4, at 175. "We reject the use of labour standards
for protectionist purposes, and agree that the compartiative advantage of countries, particu-
larly low-wage developing countries, must in no way be put into question." Id.
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parties from competing with each other through "unfair"-that is,
collectively destructive-trading practices.
Against this background, the exclusion of labor (and environmental)
standards from the global trading regime makes little sense. A govern-
ment that solicits or permits practices that prevent workers from using
their economic power to improve their compensation and conditions of
employment is engaged in a form of competition that undermines inter-
nationally agreed norms of fairness as is a government that subsidizes
exports or turns a blind eye to intellectual piracy. While the decision may
be rational for individual countries in the short-term (at least from the
point of view of national political and economic elites), its overall effect
is to reward countries that repress and impoverish their labor force, de-
pressing global economic demand and fostering social instability.
This omission could be remedied by requiring WTO members to ad-
here to internationally accepted core labor rights and allowing importing
countries to impose countervailing duties on goods from countries in
violation of their commitments following a decision under the WTO's
dispute settlement procedures. These tariffs would allow importers to
raise the price of incoming goods to the level they would have cost had
the exporting country been in compliance with core labor standards.
Such a system would be no more "protectionist" than the WTO's current
rules against other forms of unfair competition.
The second problem with the WTO's refusal to accept the principle
of trade-labor conditionality is that the implicit assumption that poor-
country workers will benefit from the comparative wage advantage of
their national economies only applies if workers are able to capture the
economic benefits of their labor. Normatively speaking, according to
orthodox economic theory, living standards will inevitably improve in
the low-wage countries that attract foreign investment as labor moves
from subsistence agriculture into waged industrial work. Over time,
wages should track productivity gains, generating a virtuous cycle of
increased demand and further investment.
The essential difficulty with this argument is that it assumes that
workers will capture a significant share of their increased productivity
through the natural operation of the labor market. In practice, however,
because employers rarely pay workers more than they are obliged to,
workers can only capture this share if they are able to exert some bar-
gaining power in the labor market. Workers represented by independent
unions are best able to secure wage increases through the collective bar-
gaining process. Even in the absence of collective bargaining, workers
can nevertheless improve their wages (albeit to a lesser extent) if their
labor is in short supply and they are able to choose their employment
[Vol. 26:39
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freely. The first of the ILO's core labor standards, the freedom of labor
association and recognition of the right to collective bargaining, clearly
envisages that workers should be able to improve their lot through union
organizing. The latter three-the prohibitions on child labor, forced labor
and on discrimination in employment--create the minimum conditions
for the functioning of a free labor market.
In the absence of these rights, therefore, workers can improve their
pay and conditions neither collectively nor, as individuals, by choosing
their occupation and employer. Current labor practices in China, as de-
picted in the AFL-CIO's petition filed on March 16, 2004 with the U.S.
Trade Representative calling for trade sanctions under Section 301 of the
1974 Trade Act (Petition), dramatically illustrate this proposition. The
petition's carefully documented analysis of labor conditions in China
belies any contention that China's trade advantage flows simply from its
"natural advantages" of a vast untapped labor force and historically low
standard of living.
The petition does not target "free trade" or China's "comparative ad-
vantage." Rather, it "challenges the artificial and severe reduction of
China's labor costs below the baseline of comparative advantage defined
by standard trade theory '2 6 through "a system of government-engineered
labor exploitation on a scale that is unmatched in the present global
economy.
27
For example, with reference to China's longstanding policies gov-
erning the country's vast pool of rural labor, the petition finds that:
Each year, millions of Chinese citizens travel from impoverished
inland villages to take their first industrial jobs in China's export
factories. Young and mostly female, they are sent by their par-
ents in search of wages to supplement their families' income.
They join an enormous submerged caste of temporary factory
workers who are stripped of civil and political rights by China's
system of internal passport controls.
They enter the factory system, and often step into a nightmare of
twelve-hour to eighteen-hour work days with no day of rest,
25. For information on the AFL-CIO Petition, see AFL-CIO, When China Represses
Workers' Rights, U.S. Workers Lose Jobs (2004), available at http://www.aflcio.org/
issuespolitics/globaleconomy/ns03162004.cfm [hereinafter Petition]. Barely a month after its
filing, the Bush Administration rejected the petition as counterproductive. U.S. Trade Repre-
sentative Robert Zoelick stated: "[W]e do not need to conduct a year-long investigation to
know that there are serious concerns with labor rights and working conditions in China."
Statement of U.S. Trade Representative Robert Zoelick on U.S. China Trades Rights, April 28,
2004 p. 3 at http:/www.ustr.gov/Documents-Library/PressReleases/2004/April.
26. See Petition, supra note 25, at 3.
27. Id.
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earning meager wages that may be withheld or unpaid alto-
gether.... They live in cramped cement-block dormitories, up to
twenty to a room, without privacy. They face militaristic regi-
mentation, surveillance, and physical abuse by supervisors
during their long day of work and by private police forces during
their short night of recuperation in the dormitories.
They are not permitted to seek better-paying jobs reserved for
privileged urban residents. If they assert their rights, they are
sent back to the countryside, or worse. Attempts to organize un-
ions or to strike are met with summary detention .... 28
The petition concludes that this common suppression of worker
rights has had the effect of lowering wages by between forty-seven and
eighty-five percent, and consequently diverting millions of manufactur-
ing jobs from countries where labor rights are not so comprehensively
denied. Unemployment and poverty among workers in developed and
developing countries have increased as a direct result.29
In essence, China's labor regime suppresses any attempt at collective
bargaining by free trade unions, while subjecting rural-mostly fe-
male-migrant workers to a system within which they have no
bargaining power as individuals.30 The Petition also demonstrates that
China's denial of worker rights provides a significant cost advantage to
China-based producers. If labor rights were enforced, it estimates that
manufacturing costs would rise between ten percent and seventy-seven
percent.
3'
The Chinese case is of more than illustrative significance. Already,
China dwarfs other developing nations in the scale of its industrial
growth and its receipt of foreign investments, while its vast rural popula-
28. Id. at 2-3 (footnotes omitted) (emphasis added). The petition demands that the
USTR and the President take three actions: 1) impose immediate trade remedies that are
commensurate with the cost advantage caused by China's denial of worker rights; 2) while the
trade remedies are in effect, negotiate a binding agreement with China providing that the U.S.
will reduce the trade remedies incrementally if China meets specific and verifiable bench-
marks of enforcement of workers' rights, and will increase the remedies if China backslides
from these benchmarks; and 3) negotiate no new WTO-related trade agreements unless the
WTO requires members to enforce core labor rights.
29. Id. at 3.
30. There are some emerging signs that suggest that certain aspects of this migrant
worker system are changing in some locations. See, for example, Congressional Executive
Commission on China (CECC) Annual Report 64 (2004), at http://www.cecc.gov/pages/
annualRpt/annualRptO4/CECCannRpt2004.pdf. As with many of China's labor laws that in
substance appear to offer important protections but too often are lacking in their application or
enforcement, see. e.g., Survey of the Implementation of "The Law of Protection of Women's
Rights," at http://www.china.org.ca/chinese/zhuanti/241695.htm, here, too, much will depend
on whether these new legal protections will be effectively implemented.
31. See Petition, supra note 25.
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tion provides an almost limitless pool of exploitable migrant labor. Its
systematic practice of labor repression not only threatens jobs in the in-
dustrialized north,32 it is also siphoning jobs and investment away from
other developing countries where conditions are less dire.
Indeed, as Sandra Polaski, former Special Representative for Inter-
national Labor Affairs at the U.S. Department of State, argues, China's
success may be forcing other developing countries to rethink their tradi-
tional hostility to trade-labor conditionality: "China now enjoys most
favored nation status and, with its vast pool of low-wage labor, will be
able to undercut virtually all other developing countries in labor-
intensive products.... Increasingly, a low-wage, low-standard strategy
will not work for other developing countries because Chinese wages are
lower still."33 Thus, developing countries may decide that it is in their
interest to enter into agreements that link trade and labor standards to
gain greater access to the rich markets they need.
Developing country labor movements are also expressing increased
willingness to incorporate core labor rights into international trade
agreements. A recent study by Gerard Griffin, Chris Nyland, and Anne
O'Rourke35 found that while there is evidence that some developing
country unions have in the past opposed linkage or offered only condi-
tional support, these unions increasingly now "hold similar views to
those of their Northern counterparts, that is, they support the linkage
demand.' 3 6 The authors surveyed the views of two Global Union Federa-
tions (GUFs), the International Metalworkers Federation (IMF), a
worldwide organization representing 24.8 million workers in all sectors
of the metals and manufacturing industry, and Education International
(El), representing 24.5 million members in the educational fields world-
wide, as well as the largest international trade union federation, the
International Confederation of Free Trade Unions (ICFTU), about
whether they favored incorporating core labor standards
37 into interna-
tional trade agreements. The authors concluded:
32. Using four different economic models, including one created by the U.S. Interna-
tional Trade Commission, itself, the AFL-CIO petition shows that China's unfair cost
advantage displaces-in a conservative estimate-approximately 727,000 jobs in the United
States. See Petition supra note 25, at 67.
33. Id.
34. See id.
35. Gerard Griffin et al., Trade Unions and the Trade-Labour Rights Lind: A North-
South Union Divide?, 19 INT'L J. CoMp. LAB. L. & INDUS. REL. 469-94 (2003).
36. See id.
37. The core labor standards referred to in the survey were the four standards enunci-
ated in the Declaration. Id. at 482-83. In fact, one of the things that made this survey possible
is the fact that there is now a set of human rights to which the world can point as the "univer-
sally accepted core labor standards."
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Our data are unequivocal: an overwhelming majority of
respondents, ninety-five per cent of GUF respondents and ninety-
seven per cent of ICFTU respondents, held the view that trade-
labour provisions are needed in trade agreements to protect core
labour standards. Further, of the remaining respondents, most
were unsure rather than opposed.... The "lowest" level [of
support] came from IMF Southern respondents; even among this
sub-group, however, 92 per cent of respondents favoured
incorporation of labour standards into trade agreements....
Turning to the future, 80 per cent of GUF respondents held the
view that trade standards could be an effective mechanism for
ensuring that core labour standards were not undermined....
Respondents perceived very strong levels of support for such
incorporation among both their fellow union officials and also,
crucially, among their union members. This level of support was
found across both El and IMF groupings and Northern and
Southern respondents."
These findings suggest that developing countries' trade unions are in-
creasingly receptive to the benefits and value that trade-labor linkage
would bring to their own countries.
IV. U.S. LEGISLATION ON TRADE-LABOR LINKAGE
Although the WTO has so far blocked moves toward effective trade-
labor linkage at the multilateral level, for two decades the U.S. Congress
has embraced the principle that access to the American market must be
conditioned on adherence to labor rights. In 1984, Congress required that
developing countries comply with internationally recognized labor rights
as a precondition to receiving special trade benefits under the General-
ized System of Preferences (GSP).39 The following year, Congress
required such compliance as a precondition to providing insurance to
U.S. investors in foreign countries under the Overseas Private Investment
Corporation Amendment Act of 1985.40 In the Omnibus Trade and Com-
petitiveness Act of 1988, 4' Congress amended Section 301 of the Trade
Act of 1974 to allow the U.S. Trade Representative to take retaliatory
action against any U.S. trading partners that displayed a:
38. Id. at 483.
39. 19 U.S.C. § 2462 (2000).(§ 2461 is beginning of Subchapter V on Generalized
System of Preferences).
40. 22 U.S.C. § 2191 (2000).
41. Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988, Pub.L. No. 100-418, § 1301, 102
Stat. 1107, 1164-76 (1988).
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persistent pattern of conduct that-
(I) denies workers the right of association,
(II) denies workers the right to organize and bargain collectively,
(III) permits any form of forced or compulsory labor,
(IV) fails to provide a minimum age for the employment of chil-
dren, or
(V) fails to provide standards for minimum wages, hours of work,
and occupational safety and health of workers.42
Through this amendment, Congress placed persistent denials of
worker rights on par with other "unreasonable acts" that burden U.S.
commerce-such as denying "fair and equitable.., provision of... pro-
tection of intellectual property rights"4' 3 and "market opportunities,
including the toleration by a foreign government of systematic anticom-
petitive activities by enterprises ... in the foreign country."" Moreover,
in Section 301 Congress not only acknowledged the importance of core
labor rights to fair trade; it also recognized, in subsection V, the signifi-
cance of minimum wage and hour standards, as well as safety and health
protections. The remedies under Section 301 are fully consistent with
that vision. They authorize the President not only to take trade action to
improve a partner's immediate labor rights practices, but also to take any
action within the foreign affairs power to change the rules of trade and
finance that encourage those violations. a
One of Congress' explicit goals in tying trade rights to respect for
labor rights was to further implement the United Nations Universal Dec-
laration of Human Rights by recognizing the importance of viewing the
right to organize and to adequate wages as fundamental human rights."
Congress also recognized that the denial of workers' fundamental rights
distributes the benefits of economic growth to "narrow privileged el-
ites, 47 thereby "retarding economic development.48
42. 19 U.S.C. § 2411 (d)(3)(B)(iii) (2000).
43. 19 U.S.C. § 241 l(d)(3)(B)(i)(I) (2000).
44. 19 U.S.C. § 241 l(d)(3)(B)(i)(IV) (2000).
45. 19 U.S.C. § 241 l(b)(2) (2000).
46. See H.R. REP. No. 98-1090 at 12 (1984) (enacting labor rights provisions of the
Generalized System of Preferences, a forerunner to the labor rights provisions of the Trade Act
amendments of 1988), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5101, 5112.
47. H.R. CONF. REP. No. 99-428, at 12 (1985) (conference report accompanying Over-
seas Private Investment Corporation Amendment Act of 1985, requiring foreign countries to
enforce basic labor rights as a precondition to providing U.S. governmental insurance to inves-
tors), reprinted in 1985 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2583, 2584.
48. Id.
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Examining the United States experience under the Generalized Sys-
tem of Preferences (GSP), the European Union experience under its
equivalent GSP, as well as other regimes, including the North American
Free Trade Agreement, the U.S -Jordan Free Trade Agreement, the Car-
ibbean Basin Trade Partnership Act, and the Africa Growth and
Opportunity Act, Sandra Polaski concludes that "cases in which claims
have arisen about labor rights violations under these programs show no
evidence of protectionism whatsoever-whether in the nature of the
charge, in the process for investigating the problem, in the nature of the
remedy, or in the final disposition of the case. 49
Similarly, economists Kimberly Ann Elliott and Richard B. Freeman
reject, as a matter of both theory and practice, the proposition that there
is an ineluctable link between protectionism and trade-labor linkage. °
They conclude that the proponents of trade and labor linkage "have little
direct protectionist motivation." They argue that worker rights petitions
under the GSP and challenges made through other bilateral and multilat-
eral instruments also "have not followed the rationale of protectionist
intent;"" the United States "has implemented trade labor-linkages in the
GSP program in a non-protectionist fashion;"52 and "international rules
can be written to constrain the protectionist use of trade remedies" by
governments who wish to move in that direction. 3
Congressional action notwithstanding, the executive branch of the
U.S. government has failed to prioritize trade-labor linkage in its interna-
tional trade relations. Indeed, the government has had a fitful and even
reluctant relationship with linkage. As a result, the U.S. labor movement,
working with its national and global trade union partners, and with
committed NGOs, has had to press the U.S. government to implement
those commitments that exist in current law; and to broaden the reach of
linkage through additional multilateral and bilateral agreements. The
U.S. government is certainly not on a steady course. After some progress
was achieved in the last years of the Clinton sdministration, the current
Bush administration's record has been most disappointing.
49. POLASKI, supra note 3, at 14.
50. KIMBERLY ANN ELLIOTT & RICHARD B. FREEMAN, INSTITUTE FOR INTERNATIONAL
ECONOMICS, CAN LABOR STANDARDS IMPROVE UNDER GLOBALIZATION? (2003).
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V. RECENT EXAMPLES OF BILATERAL
TRADE-LABOR LINKAGE
The promise of international instruments that condition trade access
on respect for labor rights is suggested by two recent models. First, the
U.S.-Cambodia Bilateral Textile Agreement, negotiated in 1999, pro-
vides increased quota incentives for "substantial compliance" with
domestic labor law and international labor standards. This "carrot" ap-
proach has proved fruitful in creating a hospitable climate for the
development of democratic trade unions, which in turn has strengthened
the rule of law. Second, in the absence of any meaningful discussion of
labor rights at the WTO, the United States, in the last years of the Clin-
ton administration, initiated certain efforts to include various forms of
worker rights provisions in its own bilateral agreement negotiations. The
Jordan Free Trade Agreement represents the first such agreement to in-
corporate core labor standards as defined by the Declaration; in which
the labor provisions are integrated into the body of the agreement, as
opposed to residing in a "labor side accord" (as, for instance, under
NAFTA); and in which there is a single enforcement scheme for viola-
tions of both trade and labor rights.
A. Cambodia
In 1999, the U.S. and Cambodian governments negotiated a unique
worker rights trade agreement that conditioned Cambodia's special ac-
cess to the $170 billion U.S. garment market on its labor record. The
agreement's premise is that trade incentives can be used to win better
enforcement of international labor standards and spur growth. After four
years, the agreement has greatly strengthened the rule of law and the
formation of a democratic trade union movement, while, at the same
time, stimulating the growth of Cambodia's garment industry.
Cheap labor and a free hand in dealing with workers' demands led
investors to Cambodia's garment industry in the mid 1990s. In 1997,
Cambodia passed a labor code that contained organizing and bargaining
rights but did little to enforce its provisions. In 1998, the U.S. garment
workers union, UNITE!, and the AFL-CIO responded to this situation by
filing a GSP complaint with the U.S. Trade Representative against the
Cambodian government for violations of workers' rights. The complaint
argued that Cambodia's new unions faced intimidation and mass firings,
which gave Cambodian producers an unfair advantage over their foreign
competitors.
The complaint led to trade and quota negotiations between the United
States and Cambodia in 1998 and 1999. The resulting U.S.-Cambodia
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textile-apparel quota agreement reflected a unique arrangement, connect-
ing trade privileges to the Cambodian government's willingness to
comply with international labor standards. Under the agreement, Cam-
bodia could win bonus quota-up to 14% more quota each year-if its
government brought garment factories into "substantial compliance"
with both Cambodian labor law and international labor standards. The
ILO monitors nearly all of the industry's 230 factories for compliance
with Cambodian labor law and core international labor standards, and
makes public reports each year that detail violations and improvements
in Cambodia's garment factories.
During the first two years of the agreement the quota incentives pro-
duced another surge in investment, as the garment industry added nearly
100 new factories. This second boom in the Cambodian garment indus-
try put the lie to claims that investment would suffer if the government
threatened to push employers onto the high road. The parties renewed
the trade agreement in 2001 and the United States offered an additional
quota increase of up to 18% per year conditioned on Cambodia's gov-
ernment and industry making greater efforts to improve working
conditions and protect worker rights.
The Cambodian government earned partial bonuses under the
agreement, which spurred additional growth within the industry." Major
American buyers such as Gap and Nike have sought out Cambodian
producers. The promise of increased quota under the textile agreement
has provided the fledgling labor movement with real opportunities to
make significant institutional gains and improve working conditions.
Two examples make this point forcefully.
In the first case, the Cambodian union movement, with assistance
from the American labor movement, the U.S. government, and the ILO,
was able to leverage the annual quota decision which the U.S. makes
under the agreement to pressure the Cambodian Ministry of Labor into
issuing a regulation that greatly expanded organizing rights. Key provi-
sions of the regulation included:
" Recognition of employers' duty to engage in collective bar-
gaining;
" The prohibition of termination of union leaders without the
consent of the Ministry of Labor, with government-ordered
reinstatement as the remedy for violations;
54. Under an ordinary quota regime, quota for the Cambodian industry would have
grown by about 30% by 2003. Instead, Cambodia's unique bonus quota has added another
40% in the categories that count most-knit shirts and pants-and 50,000 new jobs.
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• Recognition of unions through simple, democratic, non-
confrontational procedures;
• Dues check-off for all registered unions; and
• Elections run by the Ministry of Labor to resolve representa-
tional challenges between unions."
Under the new regulations, Cambodian unions have been able to win
more rights for their members. In November 2003, one of Cambodia's
most democratic unions, the Solidarity Workers Union at the Four Sea-
sons garment factory in Phnom Penh, signed Cambodia's first genuine
collective bargaining agreement, winning improvements in wages, health
care, safety standards, work rules, and maternity leave for those it repre-
sents.
Second, in the run-up to the 2002 quota decision the Ministry of La-
bor created a labor arbitration council, giving effect to the so far dormant
provision of the 1997 Labor Code.56 Since then, arbitration awards have
issued in disputes, and additional cases have gone to settlement.
The arbitration process has yielded to garment unions important victo-
ries regarding such issues as reinstatement of shop stewards terminated
without permission of the Ministry of Labor,57 paid maternity leave,58 un-
ion dues deduction,59 uniform criteria for payment of bonuses (including
the setting of production standards that do not endanger worker health),60
employers' responsibility to bear the cost of pre-employment physical ex-61 6
ams, and provision of on-site day care.62 Arbitration decisions refer not
55. See Prakas on Representativeness of Professional Organizations of Workers at the
Enterprise or Establishment Level and the Right to Collective Bargaining for the Conclusion
of Collective Agreements at that Level, Kingdom of Cambodia Ministry of Social Affairs,
Labor, Vocational Training, and Youth Rehabilitation, No. 305 MOSALVY (Nov. 11, 2001).
Card-check procedures in this Prakas are referred to as "determining most-representativeness."
56. Cambodia Labor Code, Art. 302 (1997).
57. Ho Hing Garment v. Cambodia Labour Union Federation, Kingdom of Cambodia
Arb. Council 17/03 & 18/03 (2003), available at http://www.arbitrationcouncil.org/pdf.files/
awards/a_ 1703_.e.pdf.
58. Id.
59. Top One Factory v. Workers who are members of the Solidarity Worker Union at
Top One Factory, Kingdom of Cambodia Arb. Council 05/03 (2003), available at http:l/www.
arbitrationcouncil.org/pdf.files/awards/a 0503_e.pdf.
60. Jacqsintex Garment Co. v. Democratic Union of Jacqsintex, Kingdom of Cambodia
Arb. Council 10/03 (2003), available at http://www.arbitrationcouncil.org/pdffiles/awards/
a91003_e.pdf.
61. Loyal Cambodia Ltd. v. Khmer Youth Federation of Trade Unions, Kingdom of
Cambodia Arb. Council 21/03 (2003), available at http://www.arbitrationcouncil.org/pdf-
files/award-case_21.pdf.
62. Arbitral Award Nos. 17/03 & 18/03, supra note 57.
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only to Cambodian labor law and prior panel decisions, but also to ILO
standards.63
Moreover, workers in other industries have also achieved substantial
victories through arbitration. In September 2003, ten new unions with
3,000 members formed Cambodia's first federation for tourism and ser-
vice workers. They promptly launched and won an arbitral challenge to
one of the most entrenched labor practices in the Southeast Asian tour-
ism industry, whereby employers routinely pocket the "service charge"
levied on customers' bills, despite the fact that Cambodian law provides
that this service charge must be given "in full" to employees. 61 In Sep-
tember 2003, an arbitration panel ruled against the Singapore-owned
Hotel Cambodian for engaging in this practice and ordered the hotel to
pay approximately fifty dollars in backpay to current and former em-
ployees and "establish, in consultation with any representative unions, a
clear and transparent method for the distribution of [100% of the service
charge] ... to staff each month., 65 The tourism worker unions then won
similar awards at other top hotels, endured an industry-wide lock-out,
and won an international campaign against Singapore-based Raffles Ho-
tels to re-hire hundreds of fired workers. Decisions from the Arbitration
Council were invaluable in holding the hotel companies accountable.
Thus, tourism workers were able to build upon the strength of their gar-
ment worker allies to demand action from the fledgling labor arbitration
system. In turn, that system may now be equipped to function as an ef-
fective legal institution.
The Cambodian experience provides a concrete example of effective
linkage between trade and labor issues. It has led not only to meaningful
sharing and redistribution of economic gains, but also to the burgeoning
of a new, free trade union movement.
The Cambodian experience also demonstrates the link between labor
activism and democratic political development, as workers led grass-
roots challenges to political candidates in the July, 2003 national elec-
tions. During the election campaign, fifty unions persuaded their
members, including teachers, garment workers, and hotel workers, to
stay away from party rallies and informational sessions and instead, to
hold their own "accountability" sessions at which they testified to the
poor conditions under which they live and work and grilled the candi-
dates about their views. In Phnom Penh, where labor is strongest, the
challengers doubled their seats in the national legislature.
63. Arbitral Award No. 10/03, supra note 60.
64. Cambodiana Hotel and Cambodiana Employees Union, Kingdom of Cambodia Arb.
Council 11/03 (2003), available at http://www.arbitrationcouncil.org/pdffiles/awards/
Case%20No%2011%20award.pdf.
65. Id. at 6.
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The U.S.-Cambodia Agreement expired at the end of 2004 along
with the WTO's Agreement on Textiles and Clothing. The trade agree-
ment and the profound changes that followed from it have put the
Cambodian industry in a position to weather the end of the quota regime.
Real problems remain: forced overtime, wrong payment of wages, a cor-
rupt labor ministry, and violence against union leaders. But producers
and their U.S. and European buyers can credibly claim that Cambodian
workers receive better treatment from their employers and their govern-
ment than do workers in China, India, Pakistan, and other major
producers. Among all the garment producing countries in Asia, only
Cambodia has the wherewithal to make this claim: a lively labor move-
ment, ILO monitoring and reporting, and a labor law written to
international standards.
B. Jordan
The Jordan Free Trade Agreement (FTA) of 2001 also represents a
breakthrough in implementing effective labor-trade linkage. This was the
first U.S. bilateral trade agreement in which the signatories reaffirmed
their commitment to, and agreed to uphold, the core labor rights articu-
lated in the ILO Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at
Work.66 Further, the dispute resolution procedures for violations of the
agreement's labor commitments are the same as for violations of com-
mercial commitments.67 Additionally, both parties agreed to support
discussions on workers' rights at the WTO.68
The Jordan FTA enforces these commitments through a simple and
straightforward dispute resolution mechanism. A process beginning with
consultations provides four separate opportunities for the parties to reach
a mutually agreeable resolution to the dispute. If, at the end of that proc-
ess, the matter is still not resolved, then "the affected Party shall be
entitled to take any appropriate and commensurate measure. 69 Although
the FTA does not define such a measure, in the case of a dispute over
labor rights, an "appropriate measure" might be the dispatch of an ILO
delegation, a training program for workplace inspectors, a monetary fine,
or the withdrawal of trade benefits under the agreement.
This agreement embodies minimal labor and trade linkage provisions
appropriate for countries that already have relatively well-developed labor
66. Agreement Between the United States of America and the Hashemite Kingdom of
Jordan on the Establishment of a Free Trade Area, Sept. 28, 2001 U.S.-Jordan, Art. 6, § 1, 115
Stat. 243 [hereinafter U.S.-Jordan Free Trade Agreement].
67. Id., Art. 17.
68. U.S.-Jordan Joint Statement on World Trade Organization Issues, para. 4 (Oct. 24,
2004), available at http://www.jordanusfta.com/documents/WTOstmt.pdf.
69. U.S.-Jordan Free Trade Agreement, supra note 66, Art. 17, Sec. 2(b).
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law systems in place: respect for domestic labor law as well as the core
labor rights, a transparent and relatively swift dispute resolution process
drawn from the main body of the agreement, and effective remedies.
Trade benefits are thus conditioned on the continued development of
democratic trade union institutions and meaningful resolution of labor
disputes.
The commitments embodied in the Jordan FTA, although significant,
are likely to be effective only with trading partners, like Jordan, whose
laws already are in relative conformity with ILO standards. Agreements
with countries whose labor laws-including enforcement-are inade-
quate, must incorporate much more elaborate mechanisms to ensure that
domestic laws are improved to meet international standards on a clear
timetable, that core labor rights are meaningfully protected, and that a
climate exists in which a free trade union movement can take root. Thus,
as AFL-CIO President John J. Sweeney has stated, the Jordan FTA
represents "only a small step toward our ultimate goal of making work-
ers' rights and environmental protections an integral part of universally
applied international trade rules.,,70 The practical impact of the Jordan
FTA may only become fully apparent if and when one of the signatories
uses it to challenge its partner's labor practices.
Unfortunately, the current U.S. administration has betrayed the
promise of the Jordan agreement by diluting its worker rights protections
in subsequent FTAs. Unlike the Jordan agreement, those adopted or be-
ing negotiated by this administration (to date, with Chile, Singapore,
Central America, Australia, and Morocco) do not contain an enforceable
commitment to respect ILO core labor standards, nor do they place labor
rights violations under the same dispute resolution mechanism as that
used for violations of the commercial provisions. Instead, these FTAs
contain only one enforceable labor commitment: to enforce domestic
labor laws. Moreover, they do not even require countries to have labor
laws, and they contain no enforceable provisions to prevent the weaken-
ing of labor laws. These provisions reflect not only a major regression
from the Jordan FTA, but also from the linkage standards contained in
current GSPs and other unilateral preference programs.
In addition, not all the countries with which the U.S. negotiates have
labor laws that meet ILO standards. Yet the new FTAs, such as Chile's
and Singapore's, contain no concrete timetables for improving labor
laws. The failure to negotiate meaningful protection of core labor stan-
dards in these agreements signals America's trading partners that at
70. John J. Sweeney, Testimony Before the Senate Finance Committee on the Jordan
Free Trade Agreement 5 (Mar. 20, 2001), available at http://www.senate/gov/-financel
032001 ;stest.pdf.
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most, they need simply to "strive"-in their own time, and by whatever
means they choose-to achieve these standards.7
VI. CONCLUSION
The campaign to achieve global adherence to core labor rights faces
enormous, ongoing challenges. Nonetheless, as the United Nations un-
ambiguously proclaimed more than a half century ago, worker rights are
human rights. Attaining and protecting them is therefore a moral impera-
tive.
Moreover, as we have discussed in this paper, creating and sustain-
ing democratic worker institutions and an international legal regime
which will promote a more equitable distribution of wealth are necessary
conditions if economic growth is to result in genuine human develop-
ment. Of course, they are not the only conditions. Universal education,
sound fiscal policy, decent and affordable health care, anti-corruption
measures, and a wide range of other initiatives and institutions also play
an essential role. What distinguishes worker rights protection from these
other measures, however, is its more direct connection to global trade.
The absence of worker protections-whether the result of active sup-
pression as in China or, as is the case in most countries, through
governmental failure to act-makes fair trade impossible and ineffi-
ciently distorts market relationships. Global rules that promote worker
rights are as necessary and appropriate as rules governing subsidies, anti-
dumping, intellectual property protections, and other trade practices that
also provide artificial and unacceptable comparative advantages.
As America experienced in the early decades of the twentieth cen-
tury with respect to competition between the States, in the absence of
such rules, governments are given incentives to allow the exploitation
and abuse of their workers. As President Clinton suggested in his speech
to the WTO, the seeds of new disruptions, new instabilities, new ine-
qualities, and new threats to the global economy will inevitable take
root.
71. While this model, for the reasons discussed, is inadequate for Chile and Singapore,
the Administration's insistence on replicating it in the proposed Central America Free Trade
Agreement (CAFTA) with Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, and Nicaragua
betrays its indifference to the need to promote core labor rights internationally. In Central
America, trade unionists routinely risk their lives for promoting freedom of association.
Meanwhile, the ILO, and even the U.S. State Department, have repeatedly criticized the viola-
tion of worker rights in these countries, where there is no political will to bring labor laws into
compliance with international standards, punish violators, or actively enforce those laws that
do exist.
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Unilateral measures that promote worker rights, such as the GSP
system and Section 301 of the Trade Act, provide important tools for
creating a level playing field. Effective bilateral or multilateral agree-
ments represent better mechanisms because of the consensus they reflect
among the trading partners involved about the need to adhere to core
labor rights. Ultimately, however, the development of laws and democ-
ratic institutions that promote and protect worker rights must form an
integral aspect of the trading system employed by all the nations within
the global economy. Until this is achieved, those countries dominating
the system, and the multi-national corporations who may be benefiting
in the short-term from the "race to the bottom," will fail to garner the
public support and political stability necessary to sustain a growing and
equitable world economy.
